



ACHIEVING REGIONAL SECURITY: ANY HOPE?

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Abstract

Globally, the history of soldiering and security services are history of classified public spirited professional endeavour. Public/ private partnership in this regard exist only in existential and operational legitimation and legitimacy requirements. Military combat/Security pundits affirmed that reducing security business to market driven commodity for the sake of demilitarisation weakens military effectiveness and restrict access due to high cost. However, while extant literature suggests plenty research done on public military/security effectiveness, little is known to research about the implications of privatising military/security services. Using content analysis method, the paper examined achieving regional security: any hope. It therefore, conclude that hope exist where both military and security remain exclusively in public sphere in a manner that is inclusive in content and professional in performance.

Keywords: Security, Soldiering, Privatisation, Inclusive security, Professional performance

Introduction

The intervention of government in economic activity may be justified by the presence of market failure so that the free market does not deliver a socially optimal outcome. The four major reasons for market failure are: monopolies the restriction of competition so that prices of a good or service are higher and its output lower than otherwise; externalities (where spill overs from an activity impinge positively or negatively on the wellbeing of people outside the activity's boundaries); an unacceptable income distribution resulting from the real operation of the market; and public goods.

The last of these is particularly relevant to the military. A public good or service as opposed to others which are publicly provided has two defining characteristics. The non-excludability characteristics means that if one person benefits from the public good everyone does no one can be excluded. The second characteristics are that it is very difficult to collect payment directly from the beneficiaries at the time the public good are lighthouses and other provisions for public safety and defence. A nation's entire citizen is protected by its military but it is not feasible to charge them for these services as they occur; nor is it likely that

individuals will voluntarily contribute towards the military in proportion to the benefits they receive from it.

Government therefore maintain a military on behalf of their populations and finance it from general taxation. The economic explanation is not the sole reason why defence is almost always a government activity. The military is closely associated for example with national pride and prestige. There is also a very wide spread belief that security must be directly provided by the state although as we will see this fairly recent fashion and increasingly subject to modification.

The Privatisation of Security

Privatising government activities has been a major activity in countries both developed and developing, since the late 1970s. In essence it involves the transfer of publicly owned and operated enterprise in such areas as transport and the supply of electricity and water into private hands. The economic rationale for privatisation is the presumption that the private profit motive will result in greater efficiency than would occur if the enterprise remains under public ownership, although comparisons of performance in



industries where both publicly and privately owned enterprise operate frequently and not support this presumption. The outcome of the very large number of privatisation completed thus far is the subject of on-going debate. In some cases there appear to have important efficiency gains while in others there have been modest. In most cases the privatised enterprise provides a different level of service to its publicly owned predecessor making it very difficult to judge whether the outcome is indeed more socially desirable. In some cases the quality of service has declined and or charges to consumers have risen. In most cases significant job losses have occurred in the quest for profit. Another point which needs emphasis is that adequate monitoring of the privatised enterprises by the state is typically difficult and costly.

For our purpose here the privatisation of security can have a number of meanings:

- Tradition mercenaries employed by a government to provide or supplement its own military
- Private Security Company personnel employed to protect economic asset owned by the government or transnational company or to advise and train the local military.
- The contracting out to private companies of the provision of good and services ranging from heavy weapons through to accounting services (out sourcing and privatisation).
- The transfer of non-core activities currently under taken by the military to other government department or civilian bodies (civilianisation).

Mercenaries

With the increasing employment of security companies to protect economic assets such as mines operated by transnational companies and to fight alongside local armed forces, mercenaries have been recently subject to considerable academic study (e.g Colliers and Mason 1999; Mills and Stremalau, 1999; Musah and Fayemi, 2000). While mercenaries are not the main interest of this chapter several points can be made.

Although current thinking condemns soldiers of fortune fighting for economic reward (e.g. United Nations General Assembly, 1989; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1998), such thinking is both recent and out of step with trends in much of Africa. Throughout the twentieth century many countries employed foreigners both as individuals and in unit to supplement their own militaries. Lock (1999) examines the employments of such personnel in the context of the downsizing of national military forces following the end of major armed conflicts. Such a trend is consistence with the weakening of the state throughout Africa and the resulting privatisation of its functions. Security has become a commodity purchased in formal or informal market. Lock regards this in all but name as demobilization in slow motion p. 20. On the supply side he point to the strong trend towards the out sourcing of foreign military policy by the U.S. government to private companies offering military and advisory and training p. 28.

Three types of services may be offered by this private military companies combat service advice and training and specialised services (e.g. air borne surveillance signal interception) with a military application. The first of this were or are provided by such companies as sand line the south African based executive outcomes (disbanded in 1999) and Ghurkha security guards (see for example Vines, 1999a, 1999b; O'Brien 2000). The second and third types are carried out by US companies like military personnel see for example Silberstein 1997, Adams 1999, Cilliers and Douglas, 1999)

Whilst I believed that the use of any of any armed force to settle disputes violates reasons for demilitarisation this beliefs may be less applicable to the employment of hitch, non-combatant military units from other countries. That is, it is likely to be more cost effective for African countries to employ Say Ocean going naval vessels from another country rather than own and complete navy of their own. This suggests that African states need agreeing in the spirit of non-offensive defence to a division of labour as regards military forces. Each country



would contribute to joint task force which would possess the whole range of military capacity but no one country would have a complete offensive force of its own.

Privatisation, Outsourcing and the Military

Two types of privatisation will be discussed the outsourcing to civilians of various activities which support the military organisation and the use of various activities which supports the military organisation and the use of private military companies for tasks previously carried out by the US military.

As to the first the case for privatisation of activities within the military is based on the usual principle the need based on budget constraint to focus on core business and to out source activities which are tangential to the core thus, Mcinerney and Pages,(1998)list military housing, information technology, conversion of excess military bases and inventory management as major examples of US military outsourcing. This has been extended to supporting military forces engaged in combat. Private contractors to NATO forces in Bosnia according to the economist provided a range of logistics and support services at about two thirds the cost had they been supplied by the military (Anon. 1999).More recently civilian contractors have become more directly involved in combat. In charting the increasing participation of civilians in war, Zampareli, (1999) notes that civilian contractors now maintain and operates high tech weapons system the distinction between civilian and military personnel in such situations is blurred. This outsourcing of military activities is not without its critics Brower, (1998) comments that US department of defence outsourcing and privatisation savings generally remain inconsequential at best anecdotal at worse such savings as have occurred have been the result of replacing permanent employees by cheaper contract staff.

Private military companies like MPRI often perform advisory and training functions for foreign government when these would have previously be under taken by the US military

some observers (e.g. Silberstein, 1997; Burton Rose and Madsen, 1999) have large questions about the lack of accountability as affairs of state are outsourced to corporations beyond public control. This trend has allowed the US government a lessened scrutiny of its foreign activities and a level of disassociation from activities it deems unpleasant necessities (Burton Rose and Madsen, 1999).

Civilianising military functions

The military in SSA typically under takes a range of functions some of which are clearly at best tangential to its core functions. On the face of it, it seems sensible to utilise military personnel to perform other social functions during those times when there re not deployed on security duties. Apart from their primary function to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation the military has taken on such other task as:

- Internal security operations against opponents of the government
- Internal security operations often together with the police service against crime and as domestic peace keepers
- Guarding Land Sea and borders against illegal immigrant and smuggling
- Protection of marine and others resources against poaching by local and foreign
- Civil defence against natural disasters
- Rescue work
- International peace keeping
- Development tasks e.g. building infrastructure

Clearly these secondary functions provided social benefits but two point need to be made. First involvement in these non-core functions may be used to secure a larger budgetary vote than is justified by the primary functions. Second the military may not perform these functions particularly effectively. According we will examine the number of examples where a transfer of such task into civilian hands is likely to mean that there are carried out more cost effectively

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has been traditionally seen as a military function. Depending on the context it



may involve the enforcement of peace by military action. More usually peacekeepers are deployed after a peace agreement has been reached to assist in the disarming and demobilizing of ex-combatants and to help in the restoration of civilian rule.

There is a debate concerning the capacity of combat troops to act as peace keepers. According to the wood *et al.*, (2001), quoted by Iribarnegaray, (2002) military combat training assumes battlefield situations which is rarely the case in peacekeeping operations. They emphasise the difficulty of combat troops switching to peacekeeping mode and note that peacekeeping activities leads to a degradation of war fighting skills. To such analyst battle field responses are ingrained in combat soldiers. An alternative view is there is no need to undo soldiers fighting skills rather there is need to add new skills such as negotiation and cross cultural communications to enable soldiers to deal with conflict non-violently. This second view seems to be wishful for military units as a whole. If there are limited to some individuals the questions need to be asked whether these individual need to belong to the military. There are also major differences between military and civilian organisations concerning degrees of hierarchy, participation in decision making and short term versus long term horizons (Gourlay, 2000).

The need for military personnel for peacekeepers is clear enough if fighting is likely to be part of their duties, or if their presence is necessary to determined conflict. That is the presence of armed peace keepers is meant to be coercive. The down side of armed peacekeepers is that their presence represents a continuation of dealing with disputes by force or by threat of force and these delays a return to civil society. The need for military personnel as peace keepers is less obvious if their functions are in such area as providing logistical support and organised man power. Civilian groups could do this task more cheaply and more effectively, and will lead more quickly to a return to civil society. Insofar as the task involved are those of peace building, the military is almost certain to be far competent than civilians. These

tasks include conflict resolution and conflict management economic and social reconstruction, retraining of ex-combatants and personal and societal healing.

Gandhi envisaged a peace army (Shantisena) of groups trained in nonviolence in every community. Such an organisation was established in India in 1958 but it has not been particularly effective (Weber, 1996). However it has inspired many other peace teams which contribute to peace building in violent context. This includes United Nations volunteer's peace brigade international and faith based organisations such as witness for peace and Christian peace maker teams (Boulding and Oberg, 1998) there are typically seen as carrying no threat, unlike military peacekeepers that are viewed as part of the conflict. They have proven particularly effective in negotiating with local warlords for space for humanitarian NGOs to work safely. A recent successful example of a joint military civilian peacekeeping operation is that in Bougainville (Wehner and Denoon, 2011). This involved unarmed military and civilian personnel from different countries and included women peacekeepers that were able to encourage the powerful role which Bougainville women played in peace making. This contrast with the limited success of most second generation UN peacekeeping missions.

What the foregoing suggests is a need for fairly strict division of labour. The military has a role in peacekeeping when armed conflict is occurring or is likely. But its coercive presence will only delay peace building and as soon as possible it should withdraw and leave the work of peace building to peace teams and humanitarian NGOs.

Internal Security

The argument can be made that internal security should be carried out by the police who operate according to quite a different ethos to the military. This proposal would clearly be relevant to SSA countries where conventional crime as opposed to civil war is the major internal security concern. There seems to be little reasons why the military should be employed on crime prevention activities when police are more specifically



trained to do so. If there are insufficient numbers of police for such duties their numbers need to be expanded.

Again there is the question of the effectiveness of the military in such activities given the orientation of their training and the frequency with which the military engages in human rights abuse as part of their involvement in internal security operations. In a candid comment following criticisms of the military for assault and theft during one of such operations in South Africa the minister of defence stated that we train our soldiers to kill and not to arrest. I don't want them among communities because they can be dangerous when provoked (Vapi, 2001).

Insurgence, Radicalisation and Security in Nigeria

Finally in 1999, they succeeded when Zamfara state began the movement of adopting Sharia in their state. The basic problem of this country is religion. What started as Boko Haram was a push from north East in Nigeria, using Christianity or Islam as a faith to achieve political, economic and social aims (Musah, and Fayemi, 2000). The intelligence behind these are those who have mixed with global insurgency for example some former military generals who by virtue of their professional exposure and training have experienced insurgency and counter insurgency knowledge. There several interpretations faith and belief system. Therefore, using personal interpretation of Islam as a faith to achieve political, economic and social aims will not be out of place. Whether it is the military or the civilian, the fact is that there many perspectives, objectives and ideology insurgency, radicalization and security of interest. The people who are behind it know what they want and they are unrelenting. They want more than political and economic power. The ideal they have is totalitarian. And in that totalitarian ideology, if it is to be put in place, if you and I are to go to court, my witness and your witness, it will have to be four of us to come and testify of an issue to one person who is a Muslim. These people are totalitarian. It is you and I that have a price. The core people behind the ideology don't have a price. Those behind this ideology

don't have a price, they believe in what they are doing and their faith is strong enough to influence someone to blow up himself with a bomb and kill others with him, not minding what the world will say. The radical process is towards an end. The end is not just political power. A totalitarian regime in the whole of Nigeria which is based on what Afghanistan stand for today.

If we are to get it right, it is that both Christianity and Islam must stop imposing extremism. The act of Totalitarian ideology must be rejected by all. It is bad ideologies that will make its adherents take control of everybody that live in that territory and everything. If you are talking about amnesty, the Nigerian government is telling you that the Boko-Haram is faceless. It was alleged that they then had Kabiru Sokoto in their custody, they knew where he was because they talk to him and he talks to them and other Boko-Haram members in their custody, In 2010, our security vote was N432 million, In 2011, it ballooned to N1.2billion. Who is accessing the money, who is retiring the money? To which office are they returning the money? Sophisticated weapons are been used, at will yet we have security agencies. The foregoing learns firmly on the dominant paradigm of privatisation of public security. It affirmed that in fact much of insurgency and radical behaviour have some military correlation at both combat and support levels.

Surveillance natural resource protection and rescue

Third areas to which military resources are allocated are surveillance natural resource protection and rescue activities. These could certainly be carried out more cheaply by other government departments or NGOs in addition it is likely that they would be carried out more effectively using personnel and equipment specific to the task.

The performance of such tasks by civilians is the norm in many countries examples include: the detection of such activities as illegal immigration and drug smuggling as well as environmental and fisheries protection along Australia's coastline and offshore maritime zone are the responsibility



of coast watch a branch of the department of customs. Coast watches a branch of the department of customs. Coast watch operates 17 aircraft and eight 38 metre ocean going patrol vessels.

- The volunteer Swedish sea rescue society operates 85 boats from 45 stations and carries out of 70 per cent of rescue on Swedish seawater and lakes.
- The south African national sea rescue institute a volunteer organisation with 24 stations and 50 rescue craft which carries out 97 per cent of rescue along south Africa's coastline at an annual cost of around R5 million.

The patrolling of coastal and EEZ waters can be carried out by civilian rather than defence force vessels and aircraft. It does not make economic sense for sophisticated fighting ships and aircraft to be engaged in patrol and fisheries protection work. In 2002, South Africa department of environment and tourism placed orders for three 45 metres inshore patrol vessels and one 80 metre deep sea patrol vessels principally for fisheries and environmental protection duties. The estimated total cost of R500m is a fraction of the initial cost of R6.9 billion for price of the four Meko class frigates ordered for the South African navy in 1999 and the cost of the latter has subsequently doubled. The operating cost of the civilian vessels will also be much less.

It is also possible to use satellites for surveillance purposes e.g. to detect and produce images of illegal fishing activity and of environmental hazards such as oil spills as well as for military purposes (see for example Anon, 2000 Couvalt, 2002). Commercially operated imaging satellites can readily produce images with a spatial resolution of one metre and could be employed in place of patrols by aircraft or ships. To use expensive naval vessels and aircraft for routine patrols work is both unnecessary and wasteful.

Summary

This paper attempted to locate military activity within the dominant paradigm of privatisation of public activities it has shown that in fact much

military activity at both combat and support levels has already been privatised. The principal motive for this has been economic but there has also been political motive for this has been economic but there have also been political benefits for governments. More specifically the paper has argued that the military is typically involved in range of tasks which lie outside its core functions. If the general presumption for privatisation is accepted the military is likely to be less effective and more costly in performing these tasks than relevant civilian bodies in term of the cost effectiveness of the particular task. It will allow the military to focus on its core tasks and it will form part of a country's demilitarisation.

This transfer of responsibility for the military to the private (civilians) sector must be accompanied by transfer of personnel. In 2002 some 7,700 defence force personnel were transferred to the South Africa police service as part of a reduction in SANDF numbers (Koopman, 2002). One concern has been the need for the retraining of soldiers in community-based policing as distinct from the attribute relevant to combat situations which dominate military training.

Conclusion

Hope exists where both military and security structures remain exclusively in public sphere in a manner that is inclusive in content and professional in performance.

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